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AB STRACT
This paper introduces a model of product evolution, and applies it to analyze in
industries characterized by rapidly advancing technology, such as electronic calculator.
Product evolution is described as the process of improvement in cost and product
performance. The current available technologies define the current 〃feasibility irontier."
A feasibility frontier is defined as the set of lowest cost products for each level of product
performance, or alternatively, the highest performance products at each possible cost level.
In addition, aバmarket frontier" is a subset of the feasibility frontier, limited to the products
which are in demand in the marketplace.
As technological innovations continue, the feasibility frontier and market frontier
shift accordingly, making products with the positive characteristics of higher performance
and/or lower cost available. Companies which βpecil止ize in producing a product of low
cost or a product of high performance on the current market frontier, may not be able
to remain competitive following a shift of the feasibility frontier. On the other hand,
successful companies which lead a shift in the market frontier may be able to achieve
both lower costs and a high degree of product differentiation.
I. Introduction
Many firms encounter fierce competition in industries subject to rapid tech-
nological change. Technological progress has been especially rapid in such consumer
electronics product line;S as electronic calculators, video cassette recorders, personal
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computers, and Japanese language word processors. For these products, performance
has been improving while price has been falling at the same time. When new
product models with higher performance and lower price are introduced, existing
models immediately become obsolete. As a result of fierce competition, new models
are developed and introduced in rapid succession. A firm can not sustain its com-
petitive advantage in an innovative product line if it fails to achieve an ongoing
process of product improvement.
For example, the first Japanese language word pr∝essor was brought to market
by Toshiba in 1979 and sold for a price of 6,300,000 yen. Afterwards, many other
firms entered the market and 64 new models were introduced in 1985. In 1986, the
lowest price model made by Canon was sold for just 38,000 yen. Moreover, the
product performance of the Japanese language word processor has been vastly
enhanced ; reaction time has been cut dramatically, printing has become more rapid,
the memory has been expanded, and the machines have been made more 〃user-friendly.
Toshiba, which was the inventor of the Japanese language word processor, has seen
its market share fall to only 9% in 1984, while that of Canon has risen to 27%.
For video cassette recorders (VCRs) as well, price has been falling rapidly,
while product performance has been improving. The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) of the United States issued a report on video machines in 1979.
At that time, Japanese VCRs were sold in the U.S. for about 1,000 dollars, and as
a result of their high price, VCRs could be afforded only by high-income consumers.
The FCC concluded that general inflation would increase costs and cause the price
of the VCE to rise t0 1,300 dollars by 1985. At this price level, it was believed that
the VCR would not be the leading video product. Video disk systems might be more
promising, with a far lower price of about 500 dollars. However, by 1985, Japanese
VCRs were selling for less than　300　dollars and the machines'performances had
been vastly enhanced. Now, the VCRs dominate video disk systems.
These facts can be explained partly by the experience curve e∬ect. Incremental
innovations have enabled firms to advance down the experience curve. If an experience
curve effect does exist, it would be advantageous for a firm to cut its prices in order
to gain market share at the sacrifice of immediate profits and to travel down the
experience curve earlier than its competitors (Dean, 1976). This kind of market
penetration pricing policy may prove effective in some industries. But, of course, it
is not always successful. During the past ten years, there have been several examples
in which this penetration strategy failed, such as Texas Instruments'digital watch
and home computer businesses.
Why did TI fail to increase its market share? The rea的n might be that they
did not take into account future performance improvements made possible through
technological innovation. In an industry where price and product performance are
rapidly changing, firms must develop a competitive strategy premised on this
54
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND PRODUCT EVOLUTION (Shintaku)
underlying dynamism (Shintaku, 1986).
This paper presents a product evolution model, which describes the process of
improvement in cost and product performance, along with expansion of market. The
product evolution model is elaborated and applied to a case of the Japanese electronic
calculator industry. In conclusion, successful competitive strategies in such industries
of rapidly advancing technology are derived from the analytical framework.
II. Product Evolution Model
1. FeasiUl軸舟ontier
First, the relation昏hip between price and performance of various products in a
certain product class (such as the electronic calculator) is considered from the producer's
viewpoint. The following assumptions are made to simplify the analysis in this
section; 1) There are many producers and the market operates under perfect com-
petition. 2) No producer can obtain excess profit and a product's price is therefore
equal to its cost. 3) All producers access to the same technologies. 4) Various
product performance characteristics can be aggregated to one dimension-though a
product usually has several dimensions of performance that are difficult to aggregate.
If currently available technologies are given, there is usually a trade-off between
cost and product performance, a frontier expressing the highest performance level
obtainable as an increasing monotonous function of cost (price). The higher the
cost, which is equal to price under our assumption of perfect competition, is, the
higher the maximum achievable performance level will be. Along the fea尽ibility
frontier, any improvement in i妃rformance requires an increase in cost. But the
improvement in performance obtained by each successive increment of additional cost
falls, according to the law of diminishing returns. Under the technology currently
available, the maximum performance level is limited at any cost and likewise the
minimum cost can not fall to generate a performance level satisfying the minimum
requirements for the product to be classi丘ed into the product class.
Figure 1 illustrates this trade-off between price and performances for the various
products within a certain product class. The horizontal axis expresses the level of
product performance, and the vertical axis represents the price. Any product can be
plotted as a certain point on this figure.
The currently available technologies de丘ne the current 〟feasibility frontier,"
which is described as the curve f on Figure 1. A feasibility frontier is denned as
the set of maximum performance levels obtainable at a given cost (price). In other
words, all products lying on the feasibilty frontier are the most advanced products
attainable under the current level of technology. Of course, any products within the
feasibility frontier (the "feasible set") can be made, but they are all inferior to
lower-priced, higher-performance products, lying on the feasibility frontier.
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Figure 1. FEASIBILITY FRONTIER
2. Consumers' Choice and the Market舟蝣ontier
According to traditional demand theory, the consumer chooses a basket of goods
(quantities) so as to maximize his/her utility subject to a budget constraint. A
more recent approach to demand theory, however, supposes that the consumer chooses
goods according to their particular characteristics, again subject to a budget constraint
(Lancaster, 1971). In the latter approach, a consumer's utility is defined in terms of
the characteristics of goods. In this paper, this approach to consumer behavior is
adopted, because it is helpful in analyzing the choice among differentiated products
within a product class. The concept of characteristics corresponds to that of product
performance m this paper.
A consumer decides whether he will buy a unit of product in a particular product
class and if so, choose a product available in the market. It is assumed that a consumer's
utility is a function of product performance and price. Any product with higher
performance and the same price or lower price and the same performance leads to
higher utility. Price is considered as a characteristic, which has negative utility for
consumers. The consumer choose the product in order to maximize his utility.
Figure 2 illustrates the mechanism of consumers'choice. All of the technologically
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Figure 2. MARKET FRONTIER
feasible products given in the market are represented a鼻the feasible set in Figure 1.
But any products within the feasible set not lying on the feasibility frontier are out
of the consumers'choice set, because the product which has a lower price and higher
performance always exists. U,a and Ub are representative indifference curves of consumer
a and consumer b respectively. Consumer a is indifferent between products on the
same indifference curve and prefers the products on V¥ to the products on V£
Therefore, for consumer a, the optimal product choice in this situation is product A.
Similarly, for consumer b, the optimal product choice in this situation is product B-
Consumer a'a indifference curves are different from those of consumer b-　The
two consumers may differ in income level or desire to buy a product in the product
class. Consumer a regards high performance as more important than low price.
Consumer　6, meanwhile, regards low price as more important. Suppose that all
consumers in the market consist of type a consumers, type 6 consumers, and inter-
mediate types of consumers with preferences lying between those of type a and
type b. The products located to the right of product A on the feasibility frontier are
too expensive and the products located to the left of product B have too poor per-
formance to attract any market demand at all. Therefore, the products on arc Aβ,
which we call the "market frontier," are the only ones actually deirはnded or traded
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in the market.
3.風ift of the Market舟ontier thr叩gh Technological血novation
If technological innovation never occurs, the feasibility frontier and the market
frontier remain　丘xed. Any firms that produce products lying along the market
frontier are able to survive. Firms choose which products on the current market
frontier to produce. Firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy might concentrate
on low-price products like product B. Other firms which pursue differentiation
strategy might concentrate on high-performance products like product A. But the
firms attempting to produce both types of products would be stuck in the middle of
the two sources of competitive advantage : lower cost and differentiation, which are
subject to a trade-off, as Porter (1980) insists.
Next, we will introduce effects of technological innovation into our model.
Abernathy et al. (1983) analyze the relationship between technological innovations
and competition, classifying technological innovations based on their impact on the
production system and on market linkage. They describe two basic kinds of impact
resulting from innovation-conservative and destructive. When innovations strengthen
the existing production system or existig market linkage, they are described as
conservative, whereas when they weaken the existing production system or existing
market linkage and lead to the emergence of new Such structures, they are described
as destructive. According to their impact, innovations are classified into four
categories : 1) regular inno-putions whose impact is conservative both on the produc-
tion system and on market linkage, 2) market niche innovations whose impact is
conservative on the production system but destructive on market linkage, 3) revolu-
tiovary innovations whose impact is conservative on market linkage but destructive
on the production system, and 4) architectural innovations whose impact is destruc-
tive both on the production system and on market linkage (Abernathy et al., 1983,
pp. 109-114).
In this section, regular innovations are added to our model. Regular innovations
result m the introduction of new products with lower price and/or higher performance
that strengthen the existing production system. But these new products are not
radically improved compared with existing products, and changes are incremental in
nature. As a result, the fesibility frontier gradually shifts to the lower-right hand
side of the graph, from f¥ through fz and to ft (see Figure 3). If regular innovations
accumulate in an industry, there may well be a considerable changes in price and
performance.
In the case of regular innovation, the distribution of consumer preferences does
not change. We can therefore assume that the indifference curves to be considered
are same as those in Figure 2. As the feasibility frontier shifts outward, the optimal
product for type a con息umers changes from Ai through As. to As, and for type 6
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Figure 3. SHIFT OF MARKET FRONTIER
BY REGULAR INNOVATIONS
consumers, from B¥ through Bt to Bz-　Thus, the market frontier shifts from A¥B¥
through AzBi t0　-Aaflij- In this process, consumers'utility increases steadily as
firms strengthen their existing market linkage.
In this case, the characteristics of the optimal product for each type of consumer
shift toward the lower-right hand side of the graph. A firm may be expected to
develop new products with lower price and higher performance if its target segment
in the market was same. Simply cutting the price of the same performance product
(政一02- Ca) might lead a firm to either change its target segment or to lose
market share. The same is true for improving performance for a given price. In
other words, pursuing only lower cost or differentiation is not su氏cient for a firm
to sustain its competitive advantage in this type of environment.
The failure of Texas Instruments in its digital watch and home computer busi-
nesses can be explained by this analytical framework. TI introduced lower price
models with same inferior performance (such as Ol or C%)- As a result, TI lost market
share and ended up suffering large losses in these lines of business.
In the following section, we will analyze the electronic calculator industry, from
its birth through its growth and competitive stages, u崩ng the product evolution
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model outlined above. Market niche innovations and revolutionary innovations will
be added to our model.
III. Evolution of the Electronic Calculator
l.蝕触itution of the Electronic Calculator for the Mechanical Calculator
The　丘rst electronic calculator using vacuum tulaes was introduced onto the
market by Samlock Comptometer Co. in 1962. Two years later, two Japanese firms,
Sharp and Canon, simultaneously came out with an improved desk-top electronic
calculator using transistors. Since that time, the market has been expanding rapidly.
By 1982, Japanese丘rms dominated world markets, with sales of electronic calculators
amounting to 152 billion yen.
During this twenty-year period, the price of electronic calculators has fallen
dramatically. The first product introduced by Sharp in 1964 sold for 535,000 yen.
But by 1982, the average price of a calculator on the Japanese market had fallen to
only 2,420 yen. In terms of performance, meanwhile, calculators have made remark-
able progress. Their calculating speed and reliability have improved, while their
size has become ever smaller. Today, calculators with the size of credit card are
available, whereas the size of first electronic calculators was the same as that of a
cash register. Moreover, some models have additional functions beyond simple
arithmetic calculations, such as keeping time and storing telephone numbers.
Currently, Casio and Sharp together dominate the market for electronic calculators
with a combined sales share that reached　70% in Japan, 1982. In the 1970's,
many Japanese点rms had entered the calculator business, with about 30 firms still
competing in 1972. After a period of fierce competition, however, a major shake out
occurred, with Casio and Sharp emerging predominant in the market.
Initially, the electronic calculator was perceived as a substitute for the mechanical
calculator, which had already undergone more than one hundred years of product
improvement since its invention. Calculators were produced in Japan for the first time
in 1923 by Tiger Calculator Co. By the late 1950's, the product had penetrated into
Japanese business o伍ces and laboratories. But after the introduction of the electronic
calculator, the new product was increasingly used as a substitution for the mechanical
calculator. In this early period in the evolution of the electronic calculator, its
market was composed mainly of substitution-oriented demand.
The mechanical calculator and the electronic calculator are based on entirely
different technologies. The performance characteristics of the latter are far superior
than those of the former, in terms of calculating speed, ease of operation, and
reliability. In addition, electronic calculators can perform far more complicated
mathematical functions. Nonetheless, in the early years, the electronic calculator was
more expensive by far than the mechanical calculator. In fact, the price of the first
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electronic calculator was as much as ten times greater than the average price of
mechanical calculator at that time (52,800 yen in 1964).
The development of the electronic calculator can thus be understood as a
revolutionary innovation. Compared with the mechanical calculator, its market was
similar, but its basic technologies was quite different as mentioned above. Such a
revolutionary product based on new technology often starts with both higher
performance and higher price. However, subsequent regular innovations in this new
technology tend to improve both cost and performance. The speed of improvement
for the new technology is typically faster than that for the old technology. In terms
of a particular type of technology, product performance increases along an S-shaped
curve as time goes on (Georghiou et al., 1986; Foster, 1986). On the other hand, produc-
tion cost decreases along a longarithmic curve with cumulative production volume
due to experience curve effects (Day and Montgomery, 1983).
Figures 4-a and 4-b illustrates a shift of the market frontier due to a revolutionary
innovation. The curve f and g are the feasibility frontiers for the old technology
and the new technology, respectively. If the distribution of consumer preferences is
the same as assumed in Figure 2, the new market frontier is the union of arcコ否
and are万富when the new technology first emerges in the market (see Figure 4-a).
Assuming that the new technology progresses faster than the old technology in terms
of performance and cost, the market frontier changes as shown in Figure 4-b.
At first, the new products based on the revolutionary technology were preferred
p erformance
Figure 4-b. TRANSITION FROM OLD TECH-
NOLOGY TO NEW TECHNOLOGY
performance
Figure 4-a. EMERGENCE OF
REVOLUTIONARY PRODUCTS
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only by consumers attaching more importance to high performance than to low price
(石高). As the new technology progresses, however, the share of consumers Who
prefer the new product increases (石高). At last, the new technology dominates the
old technology completely and all consumers prefer the new product (石高).
This process corresponds closely to the historical changeover process in the
calculator industry described above. At丘rst, the electronic calculator was purchased
by scientists and engineers who required advanced functions for professional purposes.
As its price fell, however, its use spread to the ordinary offices. The total production
value of electronic calculators first exceeded that of its mechanical alternative in
1967, its production volume first exceeded in 1970, and finally, in 1975, electronic
calculators began to sell for a lower average price. In this process, the average price
of mechanical calculators also fell-as low as 10,000 yen in 1974. However, this
decrease is primarily a reflection of a shift of the composition of demand in the
process of substitution, rather than of technological improvement. In lower-price
segments, it took longer for the electronic calculator to be substituted than in the
high-price, high-t治rformance segments.
2. Creation of a New Market Niche
In its early years, the market of electronic calculator was similar to that of the
mechanical calculator, as described above. However, the rapid sales growth in this
market can not be explained entirely by the substitution effect alone. A brand-new
market, composed of personal users, was discovered and cultivated in the first half
of the 1970s. During this period, Sharp's sales share fell from 25.5% in 1971 to
14.5% in 1975, and that of Canon declined from 14% in 1971 to 8.8% in 1975.
These two technological innovators were losing their market share. Meanwhile, CaSio,
which was technologically a follower, increased its　姐Ies share dramatically from
6.5%　to 26.3%, during the same period.
In 1970, the market was dominated by products with a twelve-digit display,
selling for a price of 110,000 to 140,000 yen. For office use, this level of performance
was regarded as the average requirement. In fact, Sharp introduced the "QT-8D"
with an eight-digit display and a price of 99,800 yen in 1969, but the product did
not sell well. The performance of the eight-digit calculation ability was inadequate
for office purposes and the price of 99,800 yen was considered too expensive for
personal user乱
In 1972, Ca且io introduced a new product, "Casio Mini," with a six-digit display
that just performed the four basic arithmetic functions. The Casio Mini was based
on a new concept and sold for a price of 12,800 yen. Casio scored a big hit with the
Casio Mini, selling two million units in the丘rat 18 month息. This was the launching
pad for Casio's future growth.
Early in the process of developing this product, Casio decided to target house-
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wives and aimed at selling it for less than 10,000 yen. Six-digit calculation was
considered the minimum requirement for housewives, although this level of perform-
ance was insu氏cient for office users. Clearly, preferences differed sharply between
the existing once users and the targetted housewive昆in terms of price and perform-
ance characteristics.
These differences are depicted in Figure 5. Even if the feasibility frontier were
to remain at its current level, a new market frontier could be found by innovative
niche creation. Arc方面represents the market frontier for the existing market. Uc
is a typical indifference curve for a type c potential consumer. If only products on
arc AB were available in the market, type c consumers might not buy any of them,
because of low utility or their budget constraint. Product B/ which is located near
product B, would fail to win over either existing consumers or type c consumers.
However, if a firm can perceive the potential demand and introduces product C,
located far to the lower of product B on the current feasibility frontier, product C
might be bought by some type c consumers.
In the case of the electronic calculator, typ杷c consumers correspond to personal
users, product B'to Sharp's "QT-8D," and product C to "Caaio Mini." In order to
create孔nd exploit a new market niche, it is essential for a丘rm to identify the
performance





Figure 6. RRODUCT LINE CHANGE OF CASIO's
HANDHELD CALCULATOR (1972-1976)
preferences of a class of potential consumers.
3. Full Line Pol秘through Successive Regular lnnαmti伽
After the introduction of the Casio Mini, other　丘rms-including many new
entrants--competed for market share in the segment of personal users. Some丘rms
focused on cutting the price of relatively low-performance products, while other firms
concentrated on developing products with ever higher performance characteristics.
Casio and Sharp, meanwhile, have maintained a full line of products, spanning a
range of prices and features. Their product lines have evolved continuously through
successive regular innovations. This full line policy made possible for them to win a
dominant market share.
Figure 6 depicts the evolution of Casio's product line from 1972 to 1976. The
86　points m this figure represent a segment of Casio's product line: hand-held
calculators selling for a price of less than 25,000 yen. The horizontal axis shows a
ranking of products according to performance as measured by three criteria: 1) the
number of digits used in calculations, 2) memory capacity, and 3) additional functions
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such as the logarithmic function. For example, F(10+l) means that the calculators
in this category have some additional functions in addition to basic arithmetic,
perform calculations to ten digits, and contain one unit of memory capacity. The
vertical axis shows the real price in 1975 yen. The 36 products are grouped into five
subsets according to the year in which each product was put onto the market.
Casio's product line shifted repeatedly to the lower right during this period.
Figure 6 bears a remarkable resemblance to Figure 3, which shows the shift of the
market frontier by regular innovations. By accumulating a series of regular innova-
tions, Casio was able to develop higher performance products and cut prices of the
same performance model at the same time. It should be noted that Casio stopped
production of the six-digit model in 1976.
The highest performance model and the lowest price model played an especially
important role in the evolution of Casio's product line. Developing the highest
performance model made it possible for Casio to keep up with technological progress
and to achieve product differentiation. The highest performance model is relatively
pro丘table though its sales volume iS not large. On the other hand, the lowest price
model is far less profitable because of severe price competition. New entry into this
segment is technologically easy. But the lowest price model is important because
the volume is very large. It helps to reduce the cost of all models due to economies
of別温Ie in purchasing or production and to the experience curve effect.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, a product evolution model was developed, allowing for shifts in
the market frontier, and the evolution of electronic calculator was analyzed by using
this model. A tentative conclusion can be derived from this analysis. The successful
competitive strategy may be quite different for each phase of a product evolution.
A firm should construct a dynamic strategy in order to sustain its competitive
advantage throughout the pr∝ess of product evolution.
First, revolutionary products tends to be introduced within a small segment of
an existing market. Such a segment is often composed of high-end users with special
needs. Sometimes, the early generation of revolutionary products is inferior to the
old product in terms of price or reliability, but superior in terms of some particular
performance characteristics. Substitution usually proceeds gradually along with cost
reduction and incremental improvements in performance. But there have been some
revolutionary products that barely survived in their limited market segment, or were
replaced by another superior revolutionary products. These unsuccessful revolutionary
products might have suffered from a limited potential for future improvement. There-
fore, it appears pioneering firms should search for new technologies with potential
for further refinement.
SB
Second, creation of a new market niche makes it possible to expand the entire
market further, well beyond the maximum growth attainable by complete substitution
for the old product. In this phase, the key to success appears to be the identification
of potential consumers'preferences, rather than the development of new technologies.
Third, after the introduction of a revolutionary product or the creation of new
market niches, successive regular innovations may play an important role. Usually,
substitution cannot proceed and a new market niche cannot grow unless many regular
innovations are allowed to accumulate. The cumulative effect of regular innovations
may be quite considerable in terms of both price and product performance. A firm
competing in industries of rapidly advancing technology should pursue both cost
reduction and continuous improvement of its products. The full-line policy adopted
by Casio, is an example of a successful strategy in this phase.
Of course, further study is needed in order to generalize this conclusion. Other
types of product evolution may be observed in other product classes. Furthermore,
there may be operational problems in applying our product evolution model to some
cases. For example, it is di氏cult to aggregate the many dimensions of performance
and to incorporate the subjective aspects of performance evaluation into the model.
Such problems provide a wealth of important topics for further work.
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